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Abstract. Among many submissions to the NIST post-quantum cryp-
tography (PQC) project, NewHope is a promising key encapsulation
mechanism (KEM) based on the Ring-Learning with errors (Ring-LWE)
problem. Since NewHope is an indistinguishability (IND)-chosen cipher-
text attack secure KEM by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform
to an IND-chosen plaintext attack secure public key encryption, accu-
rate calculation of decryption failure rate (DFR) is required to guarantee
resilience against attacks that exploit decryption failures. However, the
current upper bound on DFR of NewHope is rather loose because the
compression noise, the effect of encoding/decoding of NewHope, and the
approximation effect of centered binomial distribution are not fully con-
sidered. Furthermore, since NewHope is a Ring-LWE based cryptosys-
tem, there is a problem of error dependency among error coefficients,
which makes accurate DFR calculation difficult. In this paper, we derive
much tighter upper bound on DFR than the current upper bound using
constraint relaxation and union bound. Especially, the above-mentioned
factors are all considered in derivation of new upper bound and the
centered binomial distribution is not approximated to subgaussian dis-
tribution. In addition, since the error dependency is considered, the new
upper bound is much closer to the real DFR than the previous upper
bound. Furthermore, the new upper bound is parameterized by using
Chernoff-Cramer bound in order to facilitate calculation of new upper
bound for the parameters of NewHope. Since the new upper bound is
much lower than the DFR requirement of PQC, this DFR margin is used
to improve the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope. As a re-
sult, the security level of NewHope is improved by 7.2 % or bandwidth
efficiency is improved by 5.9 %. This improvement in the security and
bandwidth efficiency can be easily achieved because there is little change
in time/space complexity of NewHope.
Keywords: Bandwidth Efficiency · Chernoff-Cramer Bound · Decryp-
tion Failure Rate · Error Dependency · NewHope · NIST · Post-Quantum Cryp-
tography · Relaxation · Security · Union Bound · Upper Bound
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1 Introduction
Current public-key algorithms based on integer decomposition, discrete loga-
rithm, and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems (e.g, RSA and elliptic curve
cryptography) have been unlikely to be broken by currently available technology.
However, with the advent of quantum computing technology such as Shor’s quan-
tum algorithm for integer factorization, current public-key algorithms can be
easily broken. For that reason, in order to avoid such security problem of future
systems, new public-key algorithms called post-quantum cryptography (PQC)
should be developed to replace the existing public-key algorithms. Therefore,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently begun
a PQC project to identify and evaluate post-quantum public-key algorithms
secure against quantum computing [1]. Among the various PQC candidates,
lattice-based cryptosystems have become one of the most promising candidate
algorithms for post-quantum key exchange. Lattice-based cryptosystems have
been developed based on worst-case assumptions about lattice problems that
are believed to be resistant to quantum computing.
Among various lattice problems, learning with errors (LWE) problem intro-
duced by Regev in 2005 [2] has been widely analyzed and used. Furthermore,
the Ring-LWE problem presented by Lynbashevsky, Peikert, and Regev in 2010
[3], which improves the computational and implementation efficiency of LWE,
has also been widely used [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. NewHope has been proposed by
Alkim, Ducas, Po¨ppelmann, and Schwabe [9], [10], which is one of the various
cryptosystems based on Ring-LWE. NewHope has attracted a lot of attention
[11], [12], [13] and it was verified in an experiment of Google [14]. The key reasons
that NewHope attracts so much attention are the use of simple and practical
noise distribution, a centered binomial distribution, and a proper choice of ring
parameters for better performance and security.
NewHope is an indistinguishability (IND)-chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)
secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that exchanges the shared secret
key based on the IND-chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure public-key encryp-
tion (PKE). Note that the IND-CPA secure PKE can be transformed into the
IND-CCA secure KEM using Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [15]. The IND-
CCA secure KEM obtained by applying FO transform to IND-CPA secure PKE
requires a very low decryption failure rate (DFR) because an attacker can ex-
ploit the decryption failure [15], [16]. Therefore, the DFR of NewHope should be
lower than 2−128 to make sure of resilience against attacks that exploit decryp-
tion failures. Note that as in Frodo [5] and Kyber [6], this study aims to achieve
the DFR lower than 2−140 to allow enough margin in NewHope. In [4], [9], an
upper bound on DFR of NewHope is derived but this upper bound on DFR is
rather loose because the compression noise, the effect of encoding/decoding of
NewHope, and approximation effect of centered binomial distribution are not
fully considered. Furthermore, according to [20], [21], accurate calculation of
DFR is difficult because there is a problem of error dependency in Ring-LWE
based cryptosystems. However, the DFR of IND-CCA secure KEM obtained by
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applying FO transform to IND-CPA secure PKE must be calculated as accu-
rately as possible because DFR is closely related to the security.
In this paper, an upper bound on DFR of NewHope, which is much closer
to the real DFR than the previous upper bound on DFR derived in [4], [9], is
derived by considering the above-ignored factors. Also, the centered binomial
distribution is not approximated to the subgaussian distribution. Especially, the
new upper bound on DFR considers the error dependency among error coeffi-
cients by using the constraint relaxation, which is an approximation of a difficult
problem to a nearby problem that is easier to solve, and union bound. Further-
more, the new upper bound is parameterized by using Chernoff-Cramer (CC)
bound in order to facilitate calculation of new upper bound for the parameters
of NewHope. Since the new upper bound on DFR of NewHope is much lower
than the DFR requirement of PQC, this DFR margin is used to improve the
security and bandwidth efficiency, which is reducing the ciphertext size.
Contributions The contributions of this paper is divided into three categories.
(1) Understanding NewHope as a Digital Communication System
NewHope can be understood as a digital communication system. Bob and Alice
are transmitter and receiver, respectively, and the 256-bit shared secret key
is a message bit stream. The difference between the encoding output v and
the received signal v′′ distorted by many factors can be modeled as a digital
communication channel. We analyze all the noise sources of this channel and
numerically calculate the noise distribution of NewHope. Also, we analyze the
encoding/decoding of additive threshold encoding (ATE) in NewHope, which is
an error-correcting code (ECC) for NewHope.
(2) DFR Analysis of NewHope By Considering Error Dependency
The previous upper bound on DFR of NewHope [4], [9] is rather loosely derived
because the compression noise, effect of encoding/decoding of ATE in NewHope,
effect of error dependency among error coefficients, and approximation effect of
the centered binomial distribution are not fully considered. However, we derive
a much closer upper bound on DFR to the real DFR than the previous upper
bound on DFR by considering the above factors ignored in the derivation of
previous upper bound [4], [9]. Also, the centered binomial distribution is used for
deriving the upper bound on DFR without approximating it to the subgaussian
distribution. As a result, a new upper bound on DFR is derived, which is less
than 2−418 for n = 1024 and 2−399 for n = 512. Note that the previous upper
bound on DFR of NewHope is less than 2−216 for n = 1024 and 2−213 for
n = 512.
(3) Improvement of Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of NewHope
By Using New DFR Margin Since the new upper bound on DFR of NewHope
is much lower than the required 2−128, this DFR margin can be exploited to im-
prove the security level by 7.2 % or bandwidth efficiency by 5.9 % without
changing the procedures of NewHope.
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2 NewHope
2.1 Parameters
There are three important parameters in NewHope: n, q, and k.
– n: the dimension n = 512 or 1024 for NewHope guarantees the security
properties of Ring-LWE and enables efficient number theoretic transform
(NTT) [18].
– q: the modulus q = 12289 is determined to support security and efficient
NTT and it is closely related with the bandwidth.
– k: the noise parameter k = 8 is the parameter of centered binomial distri-
bution, which determines the noise strength and hence directly affects the
security and DFR [4].
2.2 Notations
– Rq = Zq[x]/(Xn + 1): the ring of integer polynomials modulo Xn + 1 where
each coefficient is reduced modulo q.
– a
$←− χ: the sampling of a ∈ Rq following the probability distribution χ over
Rq.
– ψk: the centered binomial distribution with parameter k, which is practically
realized by
∑k−1
i=0 (bi − b′i), where bi and b′i are uniformly and independently
sampled from {0, 1}. The variance of ψk is k/2 [4].
– a ◦ b: the coefficient-wise product of polynomials a and b.
2.3 NewHope Protocol
NewHope is a lattice-based KEM for Alice (Server) and Bob (Client) to share
256-bit secret key with each other. The protocol of NewHope is briefly explained
based on Fig. 1 as follows, where the functions are the same ones as defined in [4].
Step 1) seed
$←− {0, 1, . . . , 255}32 denotes a uniform sampling of 32 byte arrays
(corresponding to 256 bits) with 32 integer elements selected between 0 and 255
by using a random number generator. Then SHAKE256(l, d), a strong hash
function [19], takes an integer l that specifies the number of output bytes and
a byte array d as its input. In NewHope, z ← SHAKE256(64, seed) denotes
that 32 byte arrays (seed) are hashed to generate 64 pseudorandom byte arrays
(z) with 64 integer elements uniformly selected between 0 and 255. Then GenA
expands 32 pseudorandom byte arrays z[0 : 31] using SHAKE128 hash function
[19] to generate the polynomial aˆ ∈ Rq where z[0 : 31] is the first 32 byte arrays
of z. Since aˆ is generated from the seed sampled following a uniform distribution,
the coefficients of aˆ also follow a uniform distribution on [0, q − 1].
Step 2) Generate polynomials (s, s′, e, e′, e′′ ∈ Rq) whose coefficients are
sampled following the centered binomial distribution ψk. The polynomials (s,
s′, e) are transformed to (sˆ, tˆ, eˆ), respectively, by applying NTT for efficient
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Fig. 1: NewHope Protocol.
polynomial multiplication. Then Alice transforms the secret key (sˆ) into byte
arrays using EncodePolynomial() which converts the polynomial (sˆ) into 2048
byte arrays.
Step 3) Alice creates a public key (pk) by converting bˆ = aˆ ◦ sˆ + eˆ and
z[0 : 31] into 1824 byte arrays by using EncodePK(), and transmits (pk) to
Bob. Then Bob transforms the received public key (pk) into (bˆ, z[0 : 31]) using
DecodePK(), and creates (aˆ) which is the same (aˆ) generated in Step 1.
Step 4) A 256-bit shared secret key (µ) is created and encoded by ATE
encoder to generate a 1024-symbol codewords v.
Step 5) Generate a ciphertext (uˆ, v′) by using the public key components bˆ,
aˆ ,the various errors tˆ, e′, e′′ and v.
Step 6) To efficiently reduce bandwidth, compression is performed on the
coefficients of v′ to generate the polynomial h, and then the ciphertext polyno-
mials (uˆ, h) are transformed into the byte arrays c by using EncodeC(), and c is
transmitted to Alice. Alice performs decompression on hˆ to restore v′. However,
this decompressed polynomial v′decomp is different from v
′ generated in Step 5,
due to the loss from compression and decompression. Alice creates v′′ by using
the received ciphertext c and sk generated in Step 2. Each coefficient of v′′ is
a sum of the corresponding coefficients of v and errors. Note that v′′ is not a
polynomial used in NewHope, but it is added in Fig. 1 for easy explanation of
the results in this paper.
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Fig. 2: An interpretation of NewHope as a digital communication system (n =
512 or 1024).
Step 7) The 256-bit shared secret key (µ) is recovered (or decrypted) from
the coefficients of v′′ by performing the decoding of ATE.
3 Understanding NewHope as a Digital Communication
System
3.1 NewHope as a Digital Communication System
In order to facilitate analysis of DFR of NewHope, it is much more convenient
to understand the protocol of NewHope as a digital communication system. For
NewHope, the mapping Z2562 → Zn2 (µ → µenc) and the mapping Zn → Z2562
(µ′enc → µ′) through ATE, n = 512 or 1024, can be regarded as encoding and de-
coding of ECC, respectively. Also, the mapping Zn2 → Rq (µ→ v) and Rq → Zn
(v′′ → µ′enc) through ATE can be regarded as modulation and demodulation, re-
spectively. Then NewHope can be understood as a digital communication system
as follows.
Bob and Alice are transmitter and receiver, respectively, and the 256-bit
shared secret key (µ) is a message bit stream. Also, the process of transmit-
ting and receiving messages (Steps 4, 5, 6, and 7) can be viewed as a digital
communication channel. In more detail, the transmitter (Bob) generates a 256-
bit message bit stream, encodes this massage into an n-bit codeword, modulates
each codeword bit to a symbol of Zq, and transmits the resulting signal (Step 4).
At the receiver (Alice), the received signal through the noisy channel is demodu-
lated and decoded (Step 7). For NewHope, a process of adding the compression
noise and the difference noise generated in Steps 5 and 6 can be regarded as
noisy communication channel. This overall process in Steps 4-7 can be described
as a digital communication system shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, µenc is the encoded signal of µ by applying encoding of ATE,
and nt represents the overall noise generated in Steps 5 and 6, which is called
the total noise nt. After interpreting NewHope as a digital communication sys-
tem, the DFR in NewHope is equivalent to the block error rate Pr(µ 6= µ′)
in a digital communication system. Therefore, in order to calculate tight upper
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Fig. 3: Encoding/Modulation and Decoding/Demodulation of ATE in NewHope.
bound on DFR of NewHope, exact analysis of encoding/modulation and decod-
ing/demodulation of NewHope and the noisy channel is required. In the following
sebsection 3.2, each operation in Fig. 2 is explained in detail and analyzed.
3.2 Analysis of Encoding/Modulation and Decoding/Demodulation
and Channel Noise of NewHope
Analysis of Encoding/Modulation and Decoding/Demodulation of NewHope:
ATE In NewHope, ATE is used to encode and modulate a message bit µi, and
decode and demodulate an erroneous message bit v′′i . Note that ATE performs
both encoding/decoding as an ECC and modulation/demodulation. The encod-
ing/modulation and decoding/demodulation procedures of ATE with m repeti-
tions are shown in Fig. 3 where m = 4 for n = 1024 and m = 2 for n = 512 [17].
The encoding of ATE is performed such that one message bit µi is repeated m
times and the modulation of ATE is a mapping of each bit to an element of Zq
(usually either 0 or b q2c) as the coefficients of v. Note that the m-repetition is
the same operation as the encoding of an m-repetition code. The demodulation
of ATE is to calculate the absolute value of the difference between the received
erroneous symbol v′′i and bq/2c over integer domain Z. The decoding of ATE is to
sum up m absolute values corresponding to the same µ′enc,i+256l, ∀l ∈ [0,m− 1]
to generate µ′s,i and compare it with the decision threshold m · q/4 to determine
if the estimate µ′i of µi is 0 or 1 as follows.
µ′s,i
µ′i=0
≷
µ′i=1
m · q
4
(1)
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Analysis of Difference Noise, Compression Noise, and Total Noise of
NewHope Total noise nt is defined as the noise contained in the received
signal v′′ except the transmitted signal v. The ith coefficient nt,i of the total
noise polynomial nt contained in the polynomial v
′′ in Step 6 is expressed as
follows.
nt,i = (v
′′ − v)i
= (v′decomp − us− v)i
= (v′ + nc − us− v)i
= (bs′ + e′′ − ass′ − e′s)i + nc,i
= (es′ − e′s+ e′′)i + nc,i
= nd,i + nc,i, (2)
where (·)i denotes the ith coefficient of the given polynomial, nc ∈ Rq is the
compression noise polynomial, nc,i is the ith coefficient of nc contained in v
′′,
nd ∈ Rq is the difference noise polynomial, and nd,i is the ith coefficient of nd
contained in v′′.
To analyze the compression noise nc,i, we first need to investigate the co-
efficient of the polynomial v′ = ass′ + es′ + e′′ being compressed, where the
coefficients of s, s′, e, and e′′ follow the predetermined centered binomial distri-
bution. However, since the coefficients of polynomial a follow a uniform distri-
bution, the coefficient of the compressed polynomial h will eventually follow a
uniform distribution. A compression to v′ is performed by applying bv′i ∗ r/qe to
the coefficients v′i of v
′ to generate the coefficient hi of h, where b·e is a rounding
function that rounds to the closest integer, r denotes the compression rate on v′,
and r = 8 for NewHope. Then the range of the compressed coefficients hi of h is
changed from [0, q − 1] to [0, r − 1] so that the number of bits required to store
a coefficient is reduced from 14 bits (= dlog2 qe) for v′ to 3 bits (= dlog2 re) for
NewHope with r = 8. Note that the smaller the value of r is, the more compres-
sion is performed. A decompression is performed by applying bhi ∗ q/re to each
of the coefficients of h. Then the coefficient takes the value from 0, bq/re,b2q/re
. . . , and b(r − 1) · q/re. This compression and decompression are illustrated in
Fig. 4, where the coefficients v′i of v
′ from different patterns (or ranges) are
mapped to different vdecomp,i values through compression and decompression. In
the end, compression and decompression can be seen as a rounding operation.
Therefore, the compression noise is inevitably generated with the maximum mag-
nitude bq/2rc and the distribution Prnc(x) of the compression noise is derived
as follows:
Prnc(x) =
 q/r, 0 ≤ x ≤ d
q
2r e − 1
0, otherwise
q/r, q − 2− d q2r e ≤ x ≤ q − 1.
(3)
To analyze the difference noise nd,i = (es
′ − e′s+ e′′)i, we use the fact that
the coefficients of e, e′, e′′, s, and s′ are independent and identically distributed
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Fig. 4: Compression and decompression mapping in NewHope.
(i.i.d.) following the same centered binomial distribution. In order to derive the
distribution of coefficient nd,i of nd, a number of convolution operations are
required because it is a sum of many i.i.d. random variables, each of which
is obtained by multiplying two i.i.d. random variables following the centered
binomial distribution. However, since it is difficult to calculate the multiple con-
volutions of the above distribution in closed form, the distribution of difference
noise is numerically calculated [13].
Total noise is a sum of compression noise and difference noise which are
independently generated. Thus, the distribution of total noise is obtained by
performing convolution of the distributions of compression noise and difference
noise as shown in Fig. 5. However, due to the error dependency among total
noise coefficients nt.i, the distribution of only one total noise coefficient cannot
be used to calculate the accurate DFR or derive a better upper bound on DFR
[20], [21].
4 DFR Analysis of NewHope By Considering Error
Dependency
In this paper, a new upper bound on DFR of NewHope, which is much tighter
than the upper bound given in [4], [9], is derived by considering the total noise
in section 3 and the centered binomial distribution without doing subgaussian
approximation. More importantly, the error dependency is considered in deriv-
ing an upper bound on DFR by using the constraint relaxation, which is an
approximation of a difficult problem to a nearby problem that is easier to solve,
and union bound.
A new upper bound on DFR of NewHope is derived by considering two
types of error dependency as shown in Fig. 6. The first type of error dependency
is analyzed for the output bit of one ATE decoder to derive an upper bound
on the BER Pr(µi 6= µ′i). In this case, the error dependencies among m input
are considered. Note that analysis of one ATE decoder is good enough because
all 256 ATE decoders are statistically identical. The analysis of second type
of error dependency is performed on 256 output bits µ′i of ATE decoders to
derive an upper bound on DFR Pr(µ 6= µ′) of NewHope. In this case, the error
dependencies among 256 bits µ′i are considered.
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Fig. 5: Distributions of total noise, compression noise, and difference noise of
NewHope (These distributions are symmetric with respect to b q2c where q =
12289).
4.1 Propose Upper Bound on BER of NewHope
Suppose that Pr(µi = 0) = Pr(µi = 1) = 1/2, then the BER is average of two
conditional probability depending on µi.
Pr(µi 6= µ′i) = Pr
(
{µi 6= µ′i} ∩ {µi = 0}) + Pr({µi 6= µ′i} ∩ {µi = 1}
)
=
1
2
(
Pr(µi 6= µ′i|µi = 0) + Pr(µi 6= µ′i|µi = 1)
)
(4)
Since Pr(µi 6= µ′i|µi = 0) and Pr(µi 6= µ′i|µi = 1) are statistically identical,
we will analysis the BER given µi = 1. Then the total noise given µi = 1
is defined by nµi=1t,i = (nt,i + µenc,ib q2c) mod q where µenc,i = 1. The output
µ′s,i of decoding/demodulation of NewHope, which is defined in section 3.2, is
determined by m dependent coefficients of v′′ given µi = 1 as follows:
µ′s,i =
m−1∑
l=0
|nµi=1t,i+256l − b
q
2
c|,
=
m−1∑
l=0
|(nt,i+256l + bq
2
c) mod q − bq
2
c| (5)
where µ′s,i ∈ Z.
In NewHope, most operations are performed over Rq = Zq[x]/(Xn + 1), but
for the convenience of analysis, we consider the two domains Z and Zq, and ex-
press the polynomials e, s, e′, s′, e′′, and nc inRq = Zq[x]/(Xn+1) by the vectors
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Demodulation & Decode of NewHope
𝑣′′ ∈ ℛ𝑞
256th
demodulator & 
Decoder
(ATE decoder)
𝑣255
′′
𝑣511
′′
𝑣767
′′
𝑣1023
′′
(𝑖+1)st
demodulator & 
Decoder
(ATE decoder)
𝑣𝑖
′′
𝑣𝑖+256
′′
𝑣𝑖+512
′′
𝑣𝑖+768
′′
𝜇′𝑖
𝜇′255
⋮
⋮
1st 
demodulator & 
Decoder
(ATE decoder)
𝑣0
′′
𝑣256
′′
𝑣512
′′
𝑣768
′′
𝜇′0
𝜇′ ∈ ℤ2
256
1st error dependency
2nd error dependency
Fig. 6: Two types of error dependency in the demodulation and decode of
NewHope.
e, s, e′, s′, e′′, and nc in Zn×1. Then, it is clear that e, s, e′, s′, e′′ ∈ Zn×1 are the
random vectors following the centered binomial distribution with the parameter
k = 8 and nc ∈ Zn×1 is the random vector following the uniform distribution
over the support [−b q2r c, b q2r c]. To express the product of two polynomials overRq = Zq[x]/(Xn+1) as an operation ◦ for the corresponding vectors over Zn×1,
we define a new operation , which is called cyclic shift product, as follows:
(e ◦ s)i = (e s)i
=
n−1∑
j=0
sign(i− j)ejs(i−j) mod n, (6)
where sign(x) = 1 when x ≥ 0, otherwise sign(x) = −1. For examples, if n = 4,
(e s)0 =

e0
e1
e2
e3

T 
+s0
−s3
−s2
−s1
 , (e s)1 =

e0
e1
e2
e3

T 
+s1
+s0
−s3
−s2
 ,
(e s)2 =

e0
e1
e2
e3

T 
+s2
+s1
+s0
−s3
 , (e s)3 =

e0
e1
e2
e3

T 
+s3
+s2
+s1
+s0
 ,
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where (·)T denotes the transpose of vector. Using the newly defined vectors e,
s, e′, s′, e′′, nc and operation , µ′s,i in (5) can be expressed as:
µ′s,i =
m−1∑
l=0
|(nt,i+256l + bq
2
c) mod q − bq
2
c|
=
m−1∑
l=0
|n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l|, (7)
where n∗t,i = (e  s′)i − (e′  s)i + e′′i + nc,i, and αi is an integer making nt,i
be in [−b q2c, b q2c] such that |αi| ≤ b(2nk2 + k + (q − 1)/r)/qc. For example, if|n∗t,i| ≤ b q2c, then αi = 0. Finally, under the assumption that an all-one message
bit is transmitted, the event of bit error is equivalent to the following inequality.
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
|n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l| ≤ 2Tm, (8)
where Tm =
m
2 b q2c is the decision threshold of ATE and 2Tm is a maximum
value of
∑m−1
l=0 |n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l|.
In order to find the support satisfying (8), some sets and vector should be
defined. Let Ω be the support of e, s, e′, s′, e′′,nc where Ω = sup(e, s, e′,
s′, e′′,nc) = {e, s, e′, s′, e′′, nc|e, s, e′, s′, e′′ ∈ [−k, k]n×1, nc ∈ [−b q2r c, b q2r c]n×1},
sup(·) denotes the support of vector, k is parameter of the centered binomial
distribution, and r is the compression rate. such that Pr(Ω) = 1. Let E be the
support of bit error where E = { ∈ Ω|Tm ≤
∑m−1
l=0 |n∗t,i+256l−qαi+256l| ≤ 2Tm}
such that Pr(µi 6= µ′i) = Pr(E).
Since (8) is the sum of m absolute values, it can be divided into m2 cases by
using matrix ym. The ym is a matrix that replaces [0, 1, 2, · · · ,m2 − 1]T with a
binary matrix having m columns and maps each element of such matrix from 0
to 1 and 1 to −1. For example, for m = 4, y40 = (1, 1, 1, 1), y47 = (1,−1,−1,−1),
and y40,1 = 1 where y
m
k and y
m
k,l denote the k-row vector and (k, l) element of
ym, respectively. Then, the set Ωk that satisfies each of m
2 cases of (8) can be
defined as follows:
Ωk = {ωk ∈ Ω|(n∗t,i+256l − q)ymk,l ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ [0,m− 1]}, (9)
where the details of Ωk is shown in Table 1. The Ω0, Ω1, · · · , and Ωm2−1 are
clearly disjoint set such that Ω = ∪m2−1i=0 Ωi and Ωi ∩Ωj = ∅ if i 6= j. If ωk ∈ Ωk,
then absolute values in (8) can be replaced with ymk as follows:
m−1∑
l=0
|n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l| =
m−1∑
l=0
(n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l)ymk,l. (10)
The bit error support E can be partitioned into m2 supports E0, E1, · · · , and
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Table 1: The details of support Ωk for m = 4
Set Set condition
Ω0 {ω0 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω1 {ω1 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω2 {ω2 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω3 {ω3 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω4 {ω4 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω5 {ω5 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω6 {ω6 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω7 {ω7 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω8 {ω8 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω9 {ω9 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω10 {ω10 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω11 {ω11 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω12 {ω12 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω13 {ω13 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q ≥ 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Ω14 {ω14 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q ≥ 0}
Ω15 {ω15 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0, n∗t,i+512 − αi+512q < 0, n∗t,i+768 − αi+768q < 0}
Table 2: The details of support Ωk for m = 2
Set Set condition
Ω0 {ω0 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0}
Ω1 {ω1 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq ≥ 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0}
Ω2 {ω2 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q ≥ 0}
Ω3 {ω3 ∈ Ω|n∗t,i − αiq < 0, n∗t,i+256 − αi+256q < 0}
Em2−1 by using the support Ωk as follows:
Ek = {k|k ∈ Ωk ∩ E}. (11)
It is obvious that Ek ⊆ Ωk for j = 0, 1, · · · , m2 − 1, Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ if i 6= j, and
E = ∪m2−1i=0 Ei. Also, Ek is expressed by using Ωk as follows:
Ek = {k ∈ Ωk|Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
(n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l)ymk,l ≤ 2Tm} (12)
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For the convenience of explanation, the inequality in (12) is expressed by using
the new variable β ∈ [Tm, 2Tm] as follows:
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
(n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l)ymk,l ≤ 2Tm
⇔
m−1∑
l=0
(n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l)ymk,l = β.
⇔
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = q
(m−1∑
l=0
αi+256ly
m
k,l
)
+ β
⇔
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = qAi + β, (13)
whereAi =
∑m−1
l=0 αi+256ly
m
k,l andAi is fully determined by n
∗
t,i, n
∗
t,i+256, n
∗
t,i+512,
and n∗t,i+768 for n = 1024 or by n
∗
t,i and n
∗
t,i+256 for n = 512, and |Ai| < mαmax
where αmax = b(2nk2 + k + (q − 1)/r)/qc. There are two constraints in (13)
such that Ai is a finite integer and
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l and β are congruent modulo
q. Thus, Ek can be expressed as union of supports satisfying two constraints on
n∗t,i and αi as follows:
Ek = {k ∈ Ωk|Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
(n∗t,i+256l − qαi+256l)ymk,l ≤ 2Tm}
=
⋃
β
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = qAi + β}
=
Amax⋃
j=Amin
(⋃
β
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = jq + β} ∩ {k ∈ Ωk|Ai = j}
)
,
where Amin = −mαmax and Amax = mαmax.
In order to calculate the BER, the occurring probability Pr(E) of the bit error
support E should be calculated. As mentioned above, since the bit error support
E can be disjointly partitioned, Pr(E) =
∑m2−1
i=0 Pr(Ei). For the description of
simplicity, we first consider the the event E0 of bit error, and it can be expressed
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as the union of different supports on j = 0 and j 6= 0 as follows:
E0 =
Amax⋃
j=Amin
(⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
0,l = jq + β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = j}
)
=
⋃
j:j 6=0
(⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = jq + β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = j}
)
∪
(⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = 0}
)
= E0,j 6=0 ∪ E0,j=0, (14)
where ym0 is all-one vector, E0,j 6=0 =
⋃
j:j 6=0
(⋃
β{0 ∈ Ω0|
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l =
jq + β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = j}
)
, and E0,j=0 =
⋃
β{0 ∈ Ω0|
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l =
β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = 0}. However, it is difficult to know the exact supports
of E0,j 6=0 and E0,j=0, and even if they are correctly known, it is very difficult
to calculate the exact occurring probabilities. Therefore, we derive the upper
bounds on the occurring probabilities of each support E0,j 6=0 and E0,j=0 through
Theorems 1 and 2, and by using such upper bounds, the occurring probability
Pr(E0) can be upper bounded.
Theorem 1 The occurring probability Pr(E0,j 6=0) of E0,j 6=0 in (14) is at most
mPr(|n∗t,i| > b q2c).
Proof. If Ai 6= 0, then at least one of αi, αi+256, αi+512, and αi+768 is not zero
for n = 1024. Similarly, for n = 512, if Ai 6= 0, then at least one of αi and
αi+256 is not zero. In the equation n
µi=1
t,i = n
∗
t,i − αiq + b q2c, since αi makes
nµi=1t,i be in [0, q − 1], αi = 0 if and only if |n∗t,i| ≤ b q2c. Conversely, αi 6= 0 if
and only if |n∗t,i| > b q2c. Therefore, at least one among |n∗t,i|, |n∗t,i+256|, |n∗t,i+512|,
and |n∗t,i+768| is greater than b q2c for n = 1024. Similarly, at least one among|n∗t,i| and |n∗t,i+256| is greater than b q2c for n = 512. Then, we can relax the
constraint {Ω0|
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l = jq+β} and make the superset whose occurring
probability is greater than or equal to origin set E0,j 6=0 as follows:
E0,j 6=0 =
⋃
j:j 6=0
(⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = jq + β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = j}
)
⊆
⋃
j:j 6=0
{0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = j}
⊆
m−1⋃
l=0
{
0 ∈ Ω0
∣∣∣|n∗t,i+256l| > q2}
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Fig. 7: The distribution of n∗t,i for n = 1024 (m = 4) and n = 512 (m = 2).
The occurring probability of E0,j 6=0 is bounded by using the union bound and
the fact that the distributions of n∗t,i,∀i ∈ [0, n− 1] are identical.
Pr(E0,j 6=0) ≤ Pr
(m−1⋃
l=0
{|n∗t,i+256l| >
q
2
}
)
≤
m−1∑
l=0
Pr
(
|n∗t,i+256l| >
q
2
)
≤ mPr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
.
uunionsq
The distribution of n∗t,i can be numerically calculated as shown in Fig. 7. By
using the distribution of n∗t,i, we can calculate Pr(E0,j 6=0) ≤ 2−564 for n = 1024
and Pr(E0,j 6=0) ≤ 2−908 for n = 512.
Theorem 2 The occurring probability of E0,j=0 is at most Pr(Tm ≤
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l ≤
2Tm).
Proof. If Ai = 0, then the superset of support of E0,j=0 can be found by relaxing
the constraints {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = 0} as follows:
E0,j=0 =
⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = β} ∩ {0 ∈ Ω0|Ai = 0}
⊆
⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = β}.
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Therefore, the occurring probability of E0,j=0 can be upper bounded through
the union bound as follows:
Pr(E0,j=0) = Pr(
⋃
β
{0 ∈ Ω0|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l = β})
≤ Pr(Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm).
uunionsq
To calculate the upper bound of probability occurring Pr(E0) through Theorems
1 and 2, the distributions of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l are required. However, since n
∗
t,i,
n∗t,i+256, n
∗
t,i+512, and n
∗
t,i+768 for n = 1024 or n
∗
t,i and n
∗
t,i+256 for n = 512 are
statistically dependent to each other, it is not only difficult to analytically calcu-
late the occurring probability Pr(E0,j=0), but also not numerically computable.
However, in this paper, the distribution of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l can be numerically
computable by decomposing
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l into the sum of i.i.d. random vari-
ables through the following Theorem 3.
Theorem 3
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l is decomposed into the sum of i.i.d random vari-
ables.
Proof. We know that n∗t,i = (e s′)i − (e′  s)i + e′′i + nc,i. Then,
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l =
m−1∑
l=0
(e s′)i+256l −
m−1∑
l=0
(e′  s)i+256l +
m−1∑
l=0
e′′i+256l +
m−1∑
l=0
nc,i+256l
(15)
If
∑m−1
l=0 (e  s)i+256l is decomposed into i.i.d. random vectors,
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l
can be also decomposed into i.i.d. random vectors. An inner product of two
vectors can be decomposed into the sum of inner products of sub vectors. Thus,∑m−1
l=0 (e  s)i+256l can be decomposed into the sum of inner products of sub
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vectors as follows for n = 1024:
3∑
l=0
(e s)i+256l =

e0
...
e256
...
e512
...
e768
...

T 

+s0
...
−s768
...
−s512
...
−s256
...

+

+s256
...
+s0
...
−s768
...
−s512
...

+

+s512
...
+s256
...
+s0
...
−s768
...

+

+s768
...
+s512
...
+s256
...
+s0
...


=

e0
e256
e512
e768

T 

+s0
−s768
−s512
−s256
+

+s256
+s0
−s768
−s512
+

+s512
+s256
+s0
−s768
+

+s768
+s512
+s256
+s0


+

e1
e257
e513
e769

T 

+s1
−s769
−s513
−s257
+

+s257
+s1
−s769
−s513
+

+s513
+s257
+s1
−s769
+

+s769
+s513
+s257
+s1


...
+

e255
e511
e767
e1023

T 

+s255
−s1023
−s767
−s511
+

+s511
+s255
−s1023
−s767
+

+s767
+s511
+s255
−s1023
+

+s1023
+s767
+s511
+s255


It is clear that each inner product of sub vectors is a similar structure and hence,
we define new random variable Wj for n = 1024,
Wj =

ej
ej+256
ej+512
ej+768

T 

+sj
−sj+768
−sj+512
−sj+256
+

+sj+256
+sj
−sj+768
−sj+512
+

+sj+512
+sj+256
+sj
−sj+768
+

+sj+768
+sj+512
+sj+256
+sj

 ,
(16)
and for n = 512,
Wj =
(
ej
ej+256
)T ((
+sj
−sj+256
)
+
(
+sj+256
+sj
))
,
(17)
Analysis of error dependencies on NewHope 19
and
∑m−1
l=0 (e  s)i+256l =
∑255
j=0Wj . Since Wj and Wj′ for j 6= j′ consist of
different random variables, Wj ’s are clearly independent to each other. Thus,
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l =
m−1∑
l=0
(
(e′  s)i+256l − (e s′)i+256l + e′′i+256l + nc,i+256l
)
=
511∑
j=0
Wj +
m−1∑
l=0
(
e′′i+256l + nc,i+256l
)
.
Note that (e′  s) and (e s′) are decomposed into 256 i.i.d. random variables
Wj , respectively. Therefore, n
∗
t,i can be decomposed into 512 random variables
Wj and 2m random variables of e
′′ and nc. uunionsq
It is difficult to calculate the distribution of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l since
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l
consists of the products and sums of 4n+ 2m random variables. However, since∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l is converted into the sum of 512 + 2m random variables, the
distribution of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l becomes numerically computable.
In conclusion, by using Theorems 1, 2, and the union bound, the occurring
probability of E0 is upper bounded as follows:
Pr(E0) = Pr(E0,j 6=0 ∪ E0,j=0)
≤ Pr(E0,j 6=0) + Pr(E0,j=0)
≤ mPr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
+ Pr
(
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm
)
.
Next, in order to calculate the BER, Pr(E1), Pr(E2), · · · , and Pr(E15) should
be calculated, and they can be calculated by using following Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 Pr(Ek) ≤ mPr(|n∗t,i| > q2 )+Pr(Tm ≤
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm),∀k ∈
[0,m2 − 1].
Proof. Ek can also expressed as a union of Ek,j 6=0 and Ek,j=0 by using ymk ,
similar to (14). First, we consider Ek,j 6=0 and then likewise the proof of The-
orem 1, the superset of Ek,j 6=0 can be found. If
∑m−1
l=0 αi+256ly
m
k,l 6= 0, then
at least one among αi, αi+256, αi+512, and αi+768 is not zero for n = 1024.
Similarly, for n = 512, if
∑m−1
l=0 αi+256ly
m
k,l 6= 0, then at least one among αi
and αi+256 is not zero. The fact implies at least one among |n∗t,i|, |n∗t,i+256|,
|n∗t,i+512|, and |n∗t,i+768| is greater than bq/2c. Then, we can also relax the con-
straint {Ωk|
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256ly
m
k,l = jq+β} and make the superset whose occurring
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probability is greater than or equal to origin set Ek,j 6=0 likewise E0,j 6=0 as follows:
Ek,j 6=0 =
⋃
j:j 6=0
(⋃
β
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = jq + β} ∩ {k ∈ Ωk|Ai = j}
)
⊆
⋃
j:j 6=0
{k ∈ Ωk|Ai = j}
=
⋃
j:j 6=0
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
αi+256ly
m
k,l = j}
⊆
m−1⋃
l=0
{
k ∈ Ωk
∣∣∣|n∗t,i+256l| > q2}
Clearly, Pr(Ek,j 6=0), ∀k ∈ [1,m2 − 1] is upper bonded as same as Pr(E0,j 6=0) by
using the union bound as follows:
Pr(Ek,j 6=0) ≤ Pr
(m−1⋃
l=0
{|n∗t,i+256l| > q2})
≤
m−1∑
l=0
Pr
(
|n∗t,i+256l| >
q
2
)
≤ mPr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
.
Also, Theorem 2 is applied to other Ek,j=0, ∀k ∈ [1,m2 − 1] as follows:
Ek,j=0 =
(⋃
β
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = β} ∩ {k ∈ Ωk|Ai = 0}
)
⊆
⋃
β
{k ∈ Ωk|
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l = β}.
Therefore, we obtain the upper bound on Pr(Ek,j=0), ∀k ∈ [1,m2−1] as follows:
Pr(Ek,j=0) ≤ Pr
(
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256ly
m
k,l ≤ 2Tm
)
.
Since expectation of Wj in (16) for j = 0, 1, · · · , 511 is sum of product of i.i.d.
random variables of e, e′, s, s′, and s′′ whose means are zero, the expectation
of Wj is zero. Also, since the distributions of e, e
′, s, s′, and s′′ are symmetric,
the distribution of Wj is symmetric. This fact guarantees that for any y
m
k , the
distributions of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256ly
m
k,l are statistically identical and therefore the
upper bounds on Pr(E1), Pr(E2), · · · , and Pr(Em2−1) are same as Pr(E0). uunionsq
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In summary, by using Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4, the upper bound on Pr(E),
which is the BER of NewHope, is derived by using the union bound as follows:
Pr(E) = Pr
(m2−1⋃
k=0
Ek
)
≤
m2−1∑
k=0
Pr(Ek)
≤ m2
(
mPr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
+ Pr
(
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm
))
.
(18)
4.2 Derivation of Upper Bound on DFR of NewHope
By using the Pr(E) in (18), the DFR can be easily upper bounded by using the
union bound.
Theorem 5 The DFR Pr(µ 6= µ′) of NewHope is upper bounded as Pr(µ 6=
µ′) ≤∑255i=0 Pr(µi 6= µ′i).
Proof. Since the DFR is the union of all bit error events, the DFR is upper
bounded by the sum of BERs by using the union bound as follows:
DFR = Pr
(
255⋃
i=0
(µi 6= µ′i)
)
≤
255∑
i=0
Pr(µi 6= µ′i)
= 256 Pr(µi 6= µ′i).
uunionsq
Each BER of outputs of ATE decoder is identical so that the upper bound on
the DFR is expressed as:
DFR ≤ 256m2
(
mPr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
+ Pr
(
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm
))
.
(19)
4.3 Parametrization of the Proposed Upper Bound on DFR of
NewHope
The computational complexity of deriving the distribution of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l
is O(k2m) since k2m operations are required to calculate the distribution of
Wj . Therefore, as k increases, the proposed upper bound on DFR of NewHope
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cannot be easily computed. For this reason, the proposed upper bound on DFR
of NewHope is parametrized for easy calculation by using CC bound in spite of
losing some tightness.
Theorem 6 (Chernoff-Cramer bound) Let Φ be a distribution over R and
let χ0, ..., χn−1 be i.i.d. random variable of Φ, with average µ. Then, for any t
such that MΦχ(t) = Eχ[exp(χt)] <∞ it holds that
Pr
[ n−1∑
i=0
χi > nµ+ β
]
≤ inf
t
exp(βt+ n ln[MΦχ(t)]) (20)
The proposed upper bound on DFR of NewHope is the sum of two occurring
probabilities Pr(|n∗t,i| > q2 ) and Pr(Tm ≤
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm) in (19) and
those probabilities can be parameterized with CC bound, respectively. In order
to apply CC bound to Pr(|n∗t,i| > q2 ), we need to calculate the moment generat-
ing function (MGF) of product of two random variables following the centered
binomial distribution. Suppose that X and Y follow the binomial distribution
with parameter 2k, and Xc and Yc follow the centered binomial distribution with
parameter k. Then Xc = X − k and Yc = Y − k and the MGF MΦXc·Yc (t) of
Xc · Yc is calculated as follows:
MΦXc·Yc (t) = EX,Y
[
e(x−k)(y−k)t
]
= EY
[
EX [e
(x−k)(y−k)t]
]
= EY
[ 2k∑
y=0
(
2k
x
)
e(x−k)(y−k)t2−x2−(2k−x)
]
= EY
[ 2k∑
y=0
(
2k
x
)
e−kt(y−k)
(1
2
et(y−k)
)x
2−(2k−x)
]
= EY
[
e−kt(Y−k)
(1
2
(et(y−k) + 1)
)2k]
= EY
[
cosh2K
( t(y − k)
2
)]
= EYc
[
cosh2K
( tyc
2
)]
. (21)
Since n∗t,i is the sum of products of two i.i.d. random variables drawn from the
centered binomial distribution, CC bound can be applied as follows:
Pr
(
|n∗t,i| >
q
2
)
= Pr
(
n∗t,i >
q
2
)
+ Pr
(
n∗t,i < −
q
2
)
= 2 Pr
(
(e s′)i − (e′  s)i > q
2
− (e′′i − nc,i)
)
≤ 2 Pr
(
(e s′)i − (e′  s)i > q
2
−
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
≤ inf
t
2 exp
(q
2
−
(
k +
q − 1
2r
)
t+ 2n lnEY
[
cosh2K
( tyc
2
)])
.
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Although the MGF of
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l is very complicated, Theorem 3 guarantees
that
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l can be decomposed into i.i.d random variables Wj such as∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l =
∑511
j=0Wj +
∑m−1
l=0 [e
′′
i+256l+nc,i+256l], where Wj is in (16). For
the convenience of analysis, the new variable W is defined as:
W =

e0
e1
e2
e3

T 

+s0
−s3
−s2
−s1
+

+s1
+s0
−s3
−s2
+

+s2
+s1
+s0
−s3
+

+s3
+s2
+s1
+s0

 .
The MGF MΦW (t) of W is
MΦW (t) = Es0,s1,s2,s3
[
Ee0
[
exp(e0(s0 + s1 + s2 + s3)t)
]
· Ee1
[
exp(e1(s0 + s1 + s2 − s3)t)
]
· Ee2
[
exp(e2(s0 + s1 − s2 − s3)t)
]
· Ee3
[
exp(e3(s0 − s1 − s2 − s3)t)
]]
. (22)
By using MΦXc·Yc (t) = EYc [EXc [exp(xcyct)]] = EYc [cosh
2K( tyc2 )] in (21),
MΦW (t) = Es0,s1,s2,s3
[
cosh2k
( t
2
(s0 + s1 + s2 + s3)
)
· cosh2k
( t
2
(s0 + s1 + s2 − s3)
)
· cosh2k
( t
2
(s0 + s1 − s2 − s3)
)
· cosh2k
( t
2
(s0 − s1 − s2 − s3)
)]
. (23)
Even if the computational complexity of MΦW is O(k
2m), by using cosh2k(t) ≤
e−kt
2
and new random variable Z = (s0 + s1 + s2 + s3)
2 + (s0 + s1 + s2− s3)2 +
(s0 + s1 − s2 − s3)2 + (s0 − s1 − s2 − s3)2, the upper bound on MΦW can be
24 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
derived, which has the complexity O(km) as follows:
MΦW (t) ≤ Es0,s1,s2,s3
[
exp
(kt2
4
(s0 + s1 + s2 + s3)
2
)
· exp
(kt2
4
(s0 + s1 + s2 − s3)2
)
· exp
(kt2
4
(s0 + s1 − s2 − s3)2
)
· exp
(kt2
4
(s0 − s1 − s2 − s3)2
)]
≤ EZ
[
exp
(zkt2
4
)]
. (24)
Then, by using CC bound and (24), Pr(Tm ≤
∑m−1
l=0 n
∗
t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm) is upper
bounded as follows:
Pr
(
Tm ≤
m−1∑
l=0
n∗t,i+256l ≤ 2Tm
)
≤ Pr
(
511∑
i=0
Wi +
m−1∑
j=0
(e′′j + nc,j) > Tm
)
≤ Pr
(
511∑
i=0
Wi ≥ Tm −m
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
≤ inf
t
exp
{(
Tm −m
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
t+ 512 lnMΦW (t)
}
≤ inf
t
exp
{(
Tm −m
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
t+ 512 lnEZ
[
exp
(zkt2
4
)]}
.
Finally, a simplified upper bound on DFR of NewHope is derived as follows:
DFR ≤ 256m2
(
inf
t
exp
{(
Tm −m
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
t+ 512 lnEZ
[
exp
(zkt2
4
)]}
+m inf
t
exp
{(
Tm −m
(
k +
q − 1
2r
))
t+ 2n lnEY
[
cosh2k
( ty
2
)]})
.
(25)
4.4 Verification of the Proposed Upper Bounds on DFR of
NewHope
We compare the proposed upper bound in (19) and the simplified upper bound
using CC bound in (25) with the current upper bound on DFR of NewHope [4],
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Fig. 8: Comparison of various upper bounds for various k (n = 1024).
[9] for various k. Note that the current upper bound on DFR of NewHope [4],
[9] is only provided when k = 8. Additionally, we compare the proposed upper
bounds with the DFR derived by assuming no error dependency as in [13]. For
convenience of expression, we will use ”Proposed upper bound” to denote the
the upper bound derived in (19), ”CC upper bound” to denote the simplified
upper bound using CC bound in (25), ”Current upper bound” to denote the
current upper bound on DFR of NewHope [4], [9], ”No error dependency” to
denote the DFR values calculated by assuming no error dependency as in [13],
and ”Monte Carlo” to denote the DFR values obtained by performing Monte
Carlo simulation of NewHope protocol.
Fig. 8 compares the various upper bounds on DFR of NewHope for various
noise parameter k for n = 1024. First of all, it is confirmed that the two proposed
upper bounds improve the upper bound more than fifty order of magnitude
compared to the current upper bound for k = 8. Note that the proposed upper
bound on DFR of NewHope is less than 10−126, the simplified upper bound is
less than 10−115, and the current upper bound is less than 10−64. If we compare
the proposed upper bound and CC upper bound, we can see that CC bound
is more loose as expected. Nevertheless, since the computational complexity of
the proposed upper bound substantially increases as k increases, the proposed
upper bound is difficult to calculate when k is large. However, CC upper bound
can be calculated for most k because CC upper bound is parameterized for easy
calculation. In Fig. 8, Monte Carlo is the DFR value obtained by performing
Monte Carlo simulation of NewHope protocol. Therefore, this DFR value reflects
the error dependency, but this simulation is only possible for higher noise case
(i.e., larger k values). If we compare the Monte Carlo with no error dependency,
26 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
Fig. 9: Comparison of various upper bounds for various k (n = 512).
it is confirmed that Monte Carlo DFR values are slightly larger than the no error
dependency. The reason for this is that NewHope uses an ECC called ATE [20],
and therefore the DFR performance is degraded due to error dependency. Also,
according to argument in [20], since NewHope uses ATE as an ECC, no error
dependency becomes too positive. Fig. 8 shows that as k increases, the proposed
upper bound and no error dependency become almost identical. It is confirmed
that the no error dependency is referred to as the lower bound of the DFR
of a ring-LWE-based cryptosystem with an error dependency [20]. Therefore,
it is guaranteed that the proposed upper bound is a fairly tight upper bound,
especially for large k.
Fig. 9 compares the various upper bounds on DFR of NewHope for various
noise parameter k for n = 512. First of all, it is confirmed that the two proposed
upper bounds improve the upper bound more than forty order of magnitude
compared to the current upper bound for k = 8. Note that the proposed upper
bound on DFR of NewHope is less than 10−120, the simplified upper bound is less
than 10−111, and the current upper bound is less than 10−63. Unlike the case of
n = 1024, the proposed upper bound can be calculated for most k when n = 512.
Thus, when n = 512, we can calculate tight upper bound values for most k. It
is confirmed that there is almost no difference between the the proposed upper
bound and no error dependency, which is the lower bound of DFR of Ring-LWE
based cryptosystem, for most k. Therefore, it is guaranteed that the proposed
upper bound is a fairly tight upper bound for most k.
In conclusion, when n = 1024 and n = 512, it is confirmed that the proposed
upper bound is fairly tight. Furthermore, Figs 8 and 9 show that when the noise
parameter k is 8, the proposed upper bound on DFR of NewHope is much smaller
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Table 3: Improved security level of NewHope based on new DFR margin (The
noise parameter of current NewHope is k = 8) and the required DFR is 2−140.
n k DFR
Cost of primal attack
Classical/Quantum [bits]
Cost of dual attack
Classical/Quantum [bits]
1024
8 ≤ 2−418 259/235 257/233
9 ≤ 2−341 262/238 261/237
10 ≤ 2−284 266/241 265/240
11 ≤ 2−240 269/244 268/243
12 ≤ 2−205 272/247 271/246
13 ≤ 2−178 275/249 274/248
14 ≤ 2−156 278/252 276/250
15 ≤ 2−137 280/254 279/253
512
8 ≤ 2−399 112/101 112/101
9 ≤ 2−325 114/103 113/103
10 ≤ 2−270 115/105 115/104
11 ≤ 2−228 117/106 117/106
12 ≤ 2−195 119/107 118/107
13 ≤ 2−169 120/109 119/108
14 ≤ 2−147 121/110 121/110
15 ≤ 2−130 122/111 122/111
than the DFR requirement of PQC. Therefore, by utilizing this new DFR margin,
the security and bandwidth efficiency of NewHope can be improved, which will
be verified in the next section.
5 Improved Security and Bandwidth Efficiency of
NewHope Based on New Upper Bound on DFR
5.1 Improved Security
Since there exists a trade-off relation between the security level and the DFR, it
is necessary to properly select the noise parameter k of centered binomial distri-
bution such that the security level and the DFR are appropriately determined
to meet the requirements. Since it is confirmed by the new upper bound on DFR
that NewHope is designed to have unnecessarily low DFR, the security level can
be more improved by using the new DFR margin which is the difference between
new upper bound and the required DFR.
Table 3 shows the improved security levels which are calculated as the cost
of the primal attack and the cost of dual attack [22] to NewHope. It is possible
to improve the security level by 7.2 % (n = 1024, k = 14) and 8.9 % (n = 512,
k = 14) while guaranteeing the required DFR of 2−140 compared with the current
NewHope. Note that such security level improvement does not require much
increase of time/space complexity in NewHope because it only changes the noise
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Table 4: Improved bandwidth efficiency of NewHope based on new DFR margin
(The noise parameter and compression rate of current NewHope are k = 8 and
r = 8, respectively and the required DFR is 2−140.).
n r k Ciphertext reduction (%) DFR
1024
8 8 0 (Current NewHope) ≤ 2−418
4
8 5.9 ≤ 2−212
9 5.9 ≤ 2−173
10 5.9 ≤ 2−144
512
8 8 0 (Current NewHope) ≤ 2−399
4
8 5.9 ≤ 2−199
9 5.9 ≤ 2−161
parameter k without any additional procedure. Therefore, this improvement of
security can be easily applied to NewHope.
5.2 Improved Bandwidth Efficiency
The bandwidth efficiency of NewHope can also be improved by utilizing new
DFR margin. An improvement of bandwidth efficiency is achieved by reducing
(or more compressing) the ciphertext size which, however, increases the com-
pression noise resulting in the DFR degradation. Even with such increased com-
pression noise, both the improvement of bandwidth efficiency and the required
DFR of 2−140 can be achieved by utilizing new DFR margin.
Table 4 shows the improved bandwidth efficiency of NewHope achieved by
additional ciphertext compression. It is possible to improve the bandwidth ef-
ficiency by 5.9 % by changing the compression rate on v′ from 8 (3 bits per
coefficient) to 4 (2 bits per coefficient) and the security level by 2.5 % by chang-
ing the noise parameter from 8 to 10 for n = 1024. Similarly, it is possible to
improve the bandwidth efficiency by 5.9 % and the security level by 1.9 % by
changing the noise parameter from 8 to 9 for n = 512. The improvement of
the security and bandwidth efficiency requires little change in the protocol of
NewHope, so that this improvement can be easily applied to NewHope.
5.3 Closeness of Centered Binomial Distribution and the
Corresponding Rounded Gaussian Distribution for Various k
The properties of rounded Gaussian distribution ξ are key factor to the worst-
case to average-case reduction for Ring-LWE. However, since a very high-precision
and high-complexity sampling is required for the rounded Gaussian distribution,
NewHope uses the centered binomial distribution ψk for practical sampling with-
out having rigorous security proof. It is generally accepted that as the centered
binomial distribution and the rounded Gaussian distribution are closer to each
other, NewHope is regarded as more secure. The closeness of two distribution
can be measured through many methods. Among them, Re´nyi divergence is a
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well-known method, which is parameterized by a real a > 1 and defined for two
distributions P and Q as follows [23], [24].
Ra(P ||Q) =
( ∑
x∈sup(P )
P (x)a
Q(x)a−1
) 1
a−1
(26)
where sup(P ) represents the support of P and Q(x) 6= 0 for x ∈ sup(P ).
We define ξk to be the rounded Gaussian distribution with the variance
σ2 = k/2, which is the distribution of b√k/2 · xe where x follows the standard
normal distribution.
For NewHope with 𝑘 = 8
Fig. 10: Re´nyi divergence of the centered binomial distribution ψk and the
rounded Gaussian distribution ξk with the same variance k/2 according to k
(a = 9).
Fig. 10 shows that the Re´nyi divergence (a = 9 is used as in [4]) of the
centered binomial distribution ψk and the rounded Gaussian distribution ξk
with the same variance k/2. It is clear that the Re´nyi divergence decreases as
k increases. Therefore, an increase in the noise parameter k can quantitatively
and qualitatively improve the security of NewHope although the time complexity
increases a little bit due to the complexity increase of calculating
∑k−1
i=0 (bi− b′i).
6 Conclusions
Since NewHope is an IND-CCA secure KEM by applying the FO transform to
an IND-CPA secure PKE, accurate DFR calculation is required to guarantee
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resilience against attacks that exploit decryption failures. However, the upper
bound on DFR of NewHope derived in [4], [9] is rather loose because the com-
pression noise and effect of encoding/decoding of ATE in NewHope are not
fully considered. Also, the centered binomial distribution is approximated by
subgaussian distribution. Furthermore, since NewHope is a Ring-LWE based
cryptosystem, there is a problem of error dependency among error coefficients,
which makes accurate DFR calculation difficult.
In this paper, an upper bound on DFR, which is much closer to the real
DFR than previous upper bound on DFR derived in [4] , [9], is derived by
considering the above-ignored factors. Also, the centered binomial distribution
is not approximated by the subgaussian distribution. Especially, the new upper
bound on DFR considers the error dependency among error coefficients by using
the constraint relaxation and union bound. Furthermore, the new upper bound
on DFR is parameterized by using CC bound in order to facilitate calculation
of new upper bound on DFR for the parameters of NewHope.
According to the new upper bound on DFR of NewHope, since it is much
lower than the DFR requirement of PQC, this DFR margin can be used to
improve the security and bandwidth efficiency. As a result, the security level
of NewHope is improved by 7.2%, or the bandwidth efficiency is improved by
5.9%. This improvement in the security and bandwidth efficiency can be easily
achieved in NewHope because there is little change in time/space complexity of
NewHope.
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